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Abstract
Rubinstein's (1988) procedure for choosing between risky prospects, based, in part, upon similarities between
prizes and probabilities across lotteries, is modified and extended to apply to a more general class of binary
choices. This modified procedure is shown to imply behaviors following from Loomes and Sugden's (1982)
Regret Theory, although under more general conditions, and provides an alternative explanation for much of
the data whieh led to the speeification of Prospect Theory's value and decision weighing functions. The
procedure also explains observed violations of stochastic dominance, transitivity, and invariance not accounted
for in available alternatives to expeeted utility.
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1. Introduction
Given a choice between risky alternatives differing substantially in expected value, indi-
vidual behavior appears fairly coherent. On the other hand, for alternatives which are at
least proportionally close in expected value, violations of the axioms of the expected
utility hypothesis occur. Two explanations for such rationality in the large, but irrational-
ity in the small, come to mind. First, cognitive and experiential limitations may force
agents to base their choices on crude approximations to their true underlying prefer-
ences. If so, then appeal to preferences for the purposes of making choices may only be
informative for options sufficiently disparate in utility. Alternatively, there may be deci-
sion costs associated with accurately and precisely evaluating the expected utilities of
alternatives. Here, should a eursury evaluation of alternatives fail to reveal one as supe-
rior, agents may choose to base their decisions upon other criteria rather than incur the
costs associated with more precise appraisal of the options.
Either of these possibilities suggests that observed irrationalities in the small may
reflect characteristics of the procedures which agents employ to make choices when
appeal to preference is uninformative. This interpretation of choice anomalies as "pro-
cess revealing" was recently explored by Rubinstein (1988) in the context of common
ratio violations of the independence axiom. The choice of B over A, but A' over B', in the152 JONATHAN W. LELAND
lotteries shown below is an example.
A: {$3000, .02; $0, .98} A': {$3000, .90; $0, .10}
B: {$6000, .01; $0, .99} B': {$6000, .45; $0, .55}
Rubinstein proposed that, given such lotteries, agents first compare their nonzero prizes
($3000 versus $6000) and corresponding probabilities (.02 versus .01 or .90 versus .45) to
see whether one alternative dominates the other. If not, agents repeat the comparisons
in terms of the similarity/dissimilarity of the prizes and their probabilities. For lotteries
judged to be similar on one of these dimensions, but dissimilar on the other, the dissim-
ilar dimension becomes decisive in determining the choice. In the choice between A and
B, for example, the latter will appear preferable to the extent that it ofl'ers a dissimilar
and better prize ($6000 versus $3000) at similar probability (.01 versus .02). Choice
between lotteries judged to be similar or dissimilar on both dimensions (as in A'B', if the
probabilities, .90 and .45, as well as the prizes, appear dissimilar in value) is assumed to
be resolved in an unspecified third step. Rubinstein (1988) inquires as to what prefer-
ences would be consistent with such a three-step decision procedure.
This article examines the implications ofthese types of comparative decision rules for
lottery pairs where each lottery involves n >2 prizes. However, in contrast to Rubinstein
(1988), and consistent with the observation that behavior appears rational in the large,
agents are assumed to resort to such rules only in instances where appeal to preference
has proven uninformative. As such. Step 1 in the decision scheme proposed in section 2
of this article is "appeal to preference," where, for alternatives differing sufficiently in
expected utility, the process terminates. Otherwise, agents proceed to Step 2 and com-
pare prizes and probabilities across alternatives in terms of their equality/inequality.
However, agents not only compare the first prizes and corresponding probabilities in
each lottery as in Rubinstein (e.g., the nonzero prizes and their probabilities in AB or A'
B'), but also the second prizes and their probabilities (e.g., $0 with $0 and .99 with .98 in
AB), and so forth, for a total of n pairs of comparisons. For each pair, agents note
whether the prizes involved are both "good" outcomes, both "bad" outcomes, or one a
"good" outcome and the other a "bad" outcome. They then conclude whether each
comparison of prizes and their corresponding probabilities "favors" the choice of one
lottery over another (e.g., if one lottery offers a larger good outcome at greater probabil-
ity), is "inconclusive" (e.g., one lottery offers a better outcome but the other offers a good
outcome at higher probability), or is "inconsequential" (i.e., the comparisons involve
identical prizes at identieal probabilities). If one lottery is favored in any ofthese paired
comparisons and inconsequential in the remainder, it is selected. Otherwise, agents
proceed to a third step in the decision procedure.
In Step 3, agents repeat the set of comparisons from Step 2 in terms of the similarity/
dissimilarity of prizes and probabilities. Again, each pair of eomparisons is judged to
favor one lottery over the other (e.g., if one lottery offers a dissimilar and greater good
outcome at similar probability), to be inconclusive (e.g., if one lottery offers a dissimilar
and greater good outcome but the other offers a good outcome at dissimilar and greater
probability), or to be inconsequential (i.e., both lotteries offer similar prizes at similar
probabilities). Once all n conclusions are reached, agents choose one lottery over theGENERALIZED SIMILARITY JUDGMENTS 153
Other if it is favored in any paired comparison and the alternative is not favored in any
paired comparison (i.e., the remainder of comparisons are either inconsequential or
inconclusive), and at random otherwise.
In expected utility, choices will be invariant to simple redeseriptions of the available
alternatives. Because the similarity model presented in section 2 involves inter-lottery
comparisons, this will not necessarily be the case. Instead, the predictions of the model
depend upon which prizes and probabilities agents compare across alternatives—deci-
sions whieh can be influenced by how the alternatives are represented. The choices of
expected utility maximizers will also be invariant to certain arithmetic manipulations
which alter the proximity of prizes or probabilities across lotteries. Because similarity
judgments among prizes and probabilities may be intransitive (e.g., in comparisons of
$10, $7, and $5, $10 may appear similar to $7, $7 similar to $5, but $10 dissimilar to $5),
choices recommended by such judgments will not be invariant to these manipulations.
Predictions following from these features of the model are presented in sections 3
through 5 and compared with those of two of the more descriptively powerful alterna-
tives to expected utility, the regret theory of Loomes and Sugden (1982) and Kahneman
and Tversky's (1979) prospeet theory.
Regret theory predicts rational violations of equivalence,' monotonicity,^ and transi-
tivity in choices between statistically dependent alternatives—predictions largely borne
out experimentally. Section 3 shows that the similarity model also predicts sueh viola-
tions and predicts that they will occur among statistically independent as well as depen-
dent alternatives. Consistent with the latter prediction, section 4 reviews evidenee re-
vealing violations of monotonicity between statistically independent alternatives. Seetion
4 also presents additional predictions regarding violations of transitivity which have no
analogs in regret theory. Specifically, the intransitive pattern of responses reported by
Tversky (1969) is shown to occur when agents pereeive similarities between probabilities
across altematives, while the opposite pattern of intransitivities is predicted when there are
similarities among the prizes. Experimental results confirming this last result are presented.
Section 5 of the article considers implications of the similarity model regarding evi-
dence upon whieh Kahneman and Tversky's (1979) prospect theory was based. Proper-
ties of that theory's decision weight funetion and value function were posited based
largely upon evidence revealing violations of the independence axiom (e.g., the choiee of
B and A' discussed earlier) and upon evidence revealing that the pattern of choices
reverses when the prizes involved are losses instead of gains.-^ Prospect theory's isolation
effect, on the other hand, followed from evidence indicating that individuals exhibiting
risk-seeking behavior in choices between simple lotteries like AB exhibit risk-averse
behavior when the alternatives are presented in a two-stage game form, in violation of
the reduetion of compound lotteries axiom. Seetion 5 shows that violations of the inde-
pendence axiom, reflection effects, and violations of the reduction of compound lotteries
axiom also follow as a consequence of similarity judgments. Reasoning identical to that
implying violations of the reduction of compound lotteries axiom also implies that agents
will exhibit systematic preference reversals among different two-stage representations of
the same pair of probability distributions of outcomes. Experimental evidence support-
ing this predietion and suggesting that such behavior is better explained by similarity
judgments than by prospect theory is reviewed.154 JONATHAN W. LELAND
2. A Model of generalized similarity judgments
This section presents a model of choice in which agents employ closely related and
increasingly liberal comparative evaluation procedures to make decisions when they are
unable or unwilling to discriminate between alternatives in terms of their expected util-
ities. For purposes of operationalizing agents' inability or unwillingness to discriminate
between alternatives elose in value, assume that they evaluate risky alternatives accord-
ing to an expected utility model incorporating a threshold or just noticeable difference
parameter, 8.^*
Consider lotteries Li and L2, where for/ = 1,2 and) = 1,2,...,«,Xy G [0, l],pij > 0,
and Sy/jy = 1.
Li = {c\\,pii;x\2,pn;--,x\n,p\n}
L2 = ix2l,P2l',X22,P22;- • •,'!<-7JI,P2II}
For the purpose of choosing between such alternatives, assume that agents employ the
following three-step decision seheme:
Step 1: Appeal to preference (i.e., compute the expected utilities of the alternatives).
If EU(Li) -I- 8 > EU(L2) then Li is preferred to L2. Otherwise, go to Step 2.
Step 2: Compare prizes xij and X2j and probabilities p\j and p2j in terms of their
equality or inequality for) = 1 to «.
Note that for each comparison of prizes, whether it involves a comparison of good
outcomes, bad outcomes, or a good and a bad outcome, good and bad are defined as
follows:
A prizex,y is a good prize if a) it is the best possible outcome in either lottery, or
b) it is greater than zero or equal to zero and not the
worst possible outcome in either lottery.
A prize Xy is a bad prize if a) it is the worst possible outcome in either lottery, or
b) it is less than zero and not the best possible outcome in
either lottery.
Conclude for each of the «-paired comparisons whether it favors Li(L2), is inconclu-
sive, or is inconsequential; these conclusions depend upon whether the prizes compared
are both defined as good outcomes, bad outcomes, or one good and one bad. Consider-
ing first the ease of unequal outcomes, if the prizes are both good, the greater one will be
favored at greater than or equal probability. If one prize is greater than the other but the
other is to occur with greater probability, the paired comparison is inconclusive—one
lottery offers a more desirable prize, but the other offers a desirable prize at higher
probability. If the two prizes are both bad outcomes, the greater (less undesirable)
outcome will instead be favored at less than or equal probability. At greater probability,
the result is inconclusive—the lottery offering the less undesirable prize, nonetheless,
does so at higher probability. Finally, in comparisons of a good and bad prize, in whichGENERALIZED SIMILARITY JUDGMENTS 155
case the former must be greater than the latter, the paired comparison favors the lottery
offering the good outcome at any positive probability.
If, instead, prizes compared are equal, then, in comparisons of good prizes, higher
probability is desirable; whereas for eomparisons of bad prizes, lower probability is
desirable. If probabilities as well as prizes are equal, then the comparison is deemed
inconsequential.
Once conclusions are reached regarding all n pairs of comparisons:
Choose Li(L2) if it is favored in any comparisons and inconsequential in the remain-
der. Otherwise, go to Step 3.
For the purposes of specifying Step 3, assume the binary relations >^ and >p, reading
"greater than and dissimilar," are striet partial orders (asymmetric and transitive)^ on con-
sequences and probabilities, respectively. As such, the similarity relations ~-^ and ~'', de-
fined hy >x and >p, are symmetric^ but not necessarily transitive, in that for some prizes x/
> Xg > Xh,Xf '^ ^^g^^ ^^Xh, butx/ > * x/,, with the same being possible for probabilities.
Step 3: Compare prizes xy with X2j and probabilities/?y with p2j in terms of their
similarity or dissimilarity for; = 1 to n.
Note for each comparison of prizes, whether it involves a comparison of good out-
comes, bad outcomes, or a good and a bad outcome, where good and bad are defined as
before. Conclude for each of the n paired comparisons whether it favors Li(L2), is
inconclusive, or is inconsequential.
When one prize is perceived as dissimilar and greater than the other, these conclu-
sions are analogous to those in Step 2. Specifically, the lottery offering the greater and
dissimilar prize will be favored at greater and dissimilar or similar probability when the
prizes compared are good, favored at less than and dissimilar or similar probability when
the prizes are bad, and favored at any probability when the prize offered is a good and is
compared with a bad. Otherwise, the pair of comparisons will be deemed inconclusive.
For prizes perceived as similar, conelusions are again entirely analogous to those in Step
2 for comparisons of equal good or bad prizes. Here, however, a good and a bad prize can be
perceived as similar. If so, and the good prize involved is also the best possible outcome in
either lottery, then the lottery containing a greater and dissimilar probability will be favored
(the best outeome or something similar to it is desirable at noticeably higher probability).
Conversely, if the bad outcome is also the worst possible outcome, the lottery containing a
lesser and dissimilar probability will be favored (for the worst outcome or something similar
to it, noticeably lower probability is desirable). Otherwise, the pairs are either inconsequen-
tial (i.e., if both prizes and probabilities are similar) or inconclusive (i.e., if the good prize is
not the best possible nor the bad prize the worst possible).
Once conclusions are reached regarding all n pairs of comparisons:
Choose L|(L2) if it is favored in any paired comparisons and L2(Li) is not favored in
any (i.e., the remaining comparisons are either inconsequential or inconclusive), and at
random otherwise.156 JONATHAN W. LELAND
With the model of choice specified, we now consider how it explains various types of
choice anomalies and, in the process, provides a reinterpretation of two of the more
powerful alternatives to expected utility—namely, Loomes and Sugden's (1982) regret
theory, and Kahneman and Tversky's (1979) prospect theory.
3. Implications consistent with regret theory
3.1. Juxtaposition effects
Consider the following 3-tuple representations, denoted RIa and Rib, of common ratio
type choices between probability distributions R(isky):{vi, X/7;x3,1 - X/7} and 5(afe):{»:2,
p;x2,, 1 - p}, for values ofxi > JC2 > X3 > 0 (0 > X3 > X2 s x\),'' \ > \ > 0,1 > p >
0, and 1 - p - \p > Q.
RIa Rib
Ra: {c\, \p;xT,,p - Xp;xT,, I - p} Rb: {vi, Xp;x3p;x3,1 - p - kp
Sa: {v2, >^;x2,p - X/j;x3,1 - p} Sb: {^3, \p;X2,p;X3,1 - p - \p}
Given either lottery pair, if choice is not resolved by appeal to preference, as will be
assumed henceforth, agents will proceed to Step 2 and compare prizes and their corre-
sponding probabilities in terms of their equality/inequality, beginning with those in the
first column of the representation (e.g.,ji:i withx2 and A/; with \p in RIa), then those in
the second column (e.g.,A2 withA;3 andp - Kp with/; - kp in RIa), and then those in the
third. Here, and henceforth, except where explicitly noted, these Step 2 comparisons will
fail to recommend a choice (e.g., in RIa, the first paired comparison favors Ra, but the
other two paired comparisons favor Sa), in which case agents proceed to Step 3. Here the
same set of comparisons is repeated except in terms of the similarity/dissimilarity of
prizes and probabilities. In RIa and Rib, probabilities are identical across matched
prize-probability pairs and, as a consequence, will be deemed similar by the symmetry
property of —''. As such:
Prediction t: For probability distributions R and S represented as RIa or Rib, simi-
larity implies that choices will be independent of p (i.e., there will be no common ratio
effects).
Next note that for either type of representation, symmetry of —'' as well as ~i' implies
that the eomparison ofthe prize-probability pair (A3, 1 - p) with itself in RIa and (A:3, 1 - p
- A/;) with itself in Rib will always be inconsequential, in which case they cannot influence
the choice made nor will changing the value of A3 here infiuence the choice. As such:
Prediction 2: For probability distributions R and S represented as RIa or Rib, simi-
larity implies that choices will be independent of the value of .V3 in the common compo-
nent, (A3, 1 - p) in RIa or (X3, I - p - X/j) in Rib (i.e., there will be no common
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Next consider choosing between Ra and Sa and between Rb and Sb wherexi > X2>
x-i > 0. Individuals for whomxi >*X2butX2 ~*X3 will exhibit the choice pattern RaRb,
as the first pair of comparisons in either representation will favor the riskier option with
the remaining pairs of comparisons being inconclusive. Individuals for whom xi —* X2
>•* X3 will choose Sa by similarity with the choice between Rb and Sb resolved at ran-
dom, producing choice patterns SaRb or SaSb. The remaining possible pattern RaSb,
however, can never systematically occur as a consequence of similarity, since for Sb to be
recommended by similarity, X] would have to appear similar to A'3 (but, if so, then both
choices are resolved at random). For prizes ordered 0 ^ X3 > A:2 > X|, on the other
hand, it is Rb which can never be selected by similarity. As such:
Prediction 3: For choices between probability distributions R and S, represented as
RIa and Rib withxi > X2 > A3 > 0 (0 > A3 > A2 > AI ), similarity implies not RaSb (not
3.2. Violations of transitivity
Consider probability distributions A: \x\,p\\xn, 1 — p\}, B: ^2,P2',XA, 1 — PT}, and C: {v:3,
1} forAi > A2 > A3 > X4 > 0 and \ = p^, > p2> p\ > Q. Suppose that agents are given
choices between A and B, B and C, and y4 and C, where the alternatives are represented
or perceived by agents as shown in RII below where PI = pi,pii = pi -I- p2andpiii =
Pl - P2.
RII
A: {ri,pi;A4,piii;A4/?iii} B: ^2,P\;x2,p\\\;x^,pm} A: \xi,pi;x4,pn;x4,p\n}
B: ix2,pi;x2,pu;x4,pm} C: {c3,p\;xi,pu-X3,pm} C: {x3,p\;x3,p\\;x
Denoting strict preference as >, individual choices between A and B, B and C, and A
and C may refiect any of eight response patterns, two of which A > B, B > C, but C > A
(henceforth ABC) and B> A,C> B,butA> C (henceforth BCA) are intransitive.'"'"
In RII, like RIa and Rib, probabilities will be compared with themselves and deemed
"similar," in which case choices will be determined either by similarities in the prizes or
at random. The only choice consistent with the intransitive pattern ABC which can be
fixed by similarity given these representations is C > A if AI —•* A3, rendering the
comparison ofAi withA3 andp\ withpi inconsequential, butA3 >* A4, in which case the
remaining two pairs of comparisons favor C. ShouldAi appear similar tOA3, however, the
choice pattern B > A, C > B, C > A is implied (i.e.,Ai —'^A3,A3 >-*A4=>AI ~-^A2,A2
>^A4 andA2 ~-^A3,A3 >^A4). The alternative intransitive pattern, on the other hand,
may oeeur if any of the following similarity relationships hold where blanks in the pat-
terns indicate choices resolved at random:
Al —•*^A2,A2 >-^A4 then patterns B, ,
A2 —•^A3,X3 >-^X4 then patterns ,C,
h BC
X4 then patterns ,C
—•^A3,A3 >-^A4, butA] >-*A3 then patterns B,C,158 JONATHAN W. LELAND
If the prizes are reflected around zero (i.e., 0 > x^ > X3 > X2 > X]), this reasoning
exactly reverses. As such:
Prediction 4: For RII representations of the choices between A and B, B and C, and A
and C, whereXI > A:2 > X3 > X4 > 0 (0 > .V4 > XT, > X2 > X\), similarity 4> not ABC
(BCA).'2
3.3. Violations of equivalence and monotonicity
Consider the following 3-tuple representation, denoted RIII, of a choice between the
probability distribution [x\, Vy,X2, Vy,XT,, Vi] and itself.
RIII
Given this choice. A' can never be systematically selected based upon similarity judg-
ments, because for this to occur it would have to be that the comparison of J:I withx3 and
Vi with 16 was inconsequential, requiringxi ~''x3. Were this so, however, then all three
pairs of comparisons would yield inconsequential results, in which case the choice would
be resolved at random ii.e.,x\ —•^X3 ^x\ —^X2 andx2 —"x:>,). If, however,jC] >-*X3,
then, \fx\ —^ X2 andx2 ~'^ x-i, A will appear preferable, since it is favored in the first
comparison (xi versusx3), with the remaining comparisons being inconsequential. More-
over, we may be able to add a sufficiently small amount E tox2 in A' without altering the
similarity perception (i.e., obtainx2 + e ~-^X3), in which case agents may systematically
violate monotonicity. As such:
Prediction 5: For choices between either equivalent lotteries or a stochastically dom-
inating and dominated alternative represented as in RIII, similarity ^ not A'.'-'
3.4. Predictions according to regret theory
Behaviors corresponding closely to those in Predictions 1,2,3,4, and 5 also follow in the
regret theory of Loomes and Sugden (1982), assuming that the lotteries involved are
statistically dependent. To see why, let S:{S 1, S2, • • • S^} be the set of possible states of the
world where each state Sy occurs with probabilitypy(2y/'7 = 1)- Let Ai and A2 be two
actions where agents choosing Ai (A2) receive outcome xy (jC2y) if state Sy occurs (/ = 1
to n). Let ~ and > denote indifference and weak preference, respectively. In regret
theory, agents choose between actions according to the decision rule Ai < A2 o
Y.jPj ^ixij,Xkj) ^ = < 0 where v);(.,.) is a real valued regret/rejoice function assumed to
exhibit the following three properties:
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2. Increasingness:Forallx/,Xj,x/, E X:\\>ixf,Xg) ^ = < 0<**>i|i(x/,jr/,) ^ = < i|)(xg,x/,);and
3. "Regret aversion" or "convexity": For all x/,Xg,jr/, E X:\\iixf,Xg) > Oandi|i(xg,x/,) >
OandiJ;(x/,x/,) > O
According to regret theory, choices between Ra and Sa and between Rb and Sb where
the alternatives are interpreted as actions will be resolved as follows:
Ra ^ ~ < Sa ^ i\p) i|;(xi,X2) + ip - \p) i|j(x3,X2) + (1 - p) Hx3,X3) > = < 0,
Rb > ~ < Sb <* (Xp) HxuXi) + p l^(X3,X2) + (l-p -\p) lKX3,X3) > = < 0.
The term i|;(x3, X3) in each expression equals zero by skew-symmetry (thus, no com-
mon consequence effects). The probability/? can be factored out of the remaining two
terms in each expression (thus, no common ratio effects). Given these simplifications,
the choice of Ra over Sa requires that X/7 > 4((XI,JC2)/[I|J(XI,X2) + ili(A:3,X2)]. The choice
of Sbover Rb requires that vl((xi,X2)/>|;(xi,X3) > \p. Regret aversion implies I|J(A-1,^2)/
[i|i(A:i,X2) + 4/(x3,X2)] > (|i(xi,X2)/i|i(xi,X3), ruling out the choice pattern RaSb.
Regarding systematic violations of transitivity, individuals choosing according to re-
gret theory will evaluate choices between A and B, B and C, and C and A, again inter-
preted as choices between actions, as follows:
4) > = < 0,
B ^ ~ < C<*pn|)(x2,X3) -F pii ^X2,X3) -I- piii l|j(X4,X3) =" = < 0,
C "" ~ < A <* PI l|j(X3,Xi) + pii vli(X3,X4) -I- piil lKX3,X4) ^ = < 0.
Exploiting the skew-symmetry property ofthe i|;(.,.) function and rearranging terms,
the ABC pattern occurs if the following expression is positive, whereas the BCA opattern
occurs if it is negative:
PI
+
Skew symmetry implies that the third term equals zero, while the convexity property of
i|;(.,.) implies that the first and second terms are negative. As such, individuals choosing
according to regret theory may exhibit the intransitive pattern BCA, but never the pat-
tern ABC.
Finally, agents behaving according to regret will choose between actions A and A' in
RIII (both corresponding to the same probability distribution) as A ^ ~ < A' <*^
'/3[i|i(xi,X3) - i|i(xi,X2) - i|j(x2,X3)]^ = < 0. Regret aversion implies that this expression
is positive so individuals will exhibit a strict preference for A. ''* To the extent that adding
a sufficiently small amount tox2 in A' does not alter this inequality, also a possibility given
the convexity of i|;(.,.), agents may also prefer A when it is stochastically dominated by A'.
These correspondences between the predictions of regret theory and those following
from the hypothesis that choices are based, in part, upon similarity judgments are not160 JONATHAN W. LELAND
accidental. The absence of common ratio effects implied by regret follows from similarity
judgments if the lotteries are represented such that probabilities across lotteries are
compared with themselves as a consequence of the symmetry property of ~P, while the
absence of common consequence violations follows from the symmetry of —" as well as
~P. Likewise, behaviors implied by the assumptions that i[»(.,.) is increasing and convex
(i.e., forxi > X2 > X3, i|i(xi,X3) > i|;(xi,X2) + i|>(x2,X3)) follow, in some cases in weaker
form,'^ from the assumption that the similarity relation, ~ ^ is not necessarily transitive
(i.e., for somexi > X2 > X3,X| —•*X2,X2 ~*X3, butxi >-*X3). These technical coinci-
dences do not, however, imply that the predictions of the models are indistinguishable,
as the following evidence and predictions reveal.
4. Implications of inconsistent with regret theory
4.1. Violations of monotonicity, again
Tversky and Kahneman (1986) presented subjects with a choice between Options A and
B below, where the probabilities of winning each prize in each lottery were described by
the percentage of marbles of different colors in different boxes.
Option A 90% white 6% red 1% green l%blue 2% yellow
$0 win $45 win $45 lose $10 lose $15
Option B 90% white 6% red 1% green l%blue 2% yellow
$0 win $45 win $30 lose $15 lose $15
Simple comparison of the lotteries by column reveals that A stochastically dominates
B, a fact recognized by all 88 of Tversky and Kahneman's (1986) subjects. They offered
an additional 124 subjects a choice between A' and B', shown below with the probabili-
ties of winning each prize in each lottery, again described by the percentage of marbles of
different colors in dijferent boxes.
Option A' 90% white 7% red 1% green 2% yellow
$0 win $45 lose $10 lose $15
Option B' 90% white 6% red 1% green 3% yellow
$0 win $45 win $30 lose $15
Given this choice, a majority of subjects (72/124 or 58%) preferred lottery B'. A
comparison of lottery A' with A, and B' with B, however, reveals that the latter are
simply reformulations of the former. '^ As such, 58% of subjects violate stochastic dom-
inance when lotteries A and B are reformulated as A' and B'.
To the extent that choices between A and B, and between A' and B' are statistically
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Both choices are, on the other hand, entirely consistent with the decision procedure
proposed in this article. To resolve the choice between A and B or A' and B', agents
would first appeal to preference. Given the small (20 cent) difference in expected values
between alternatives, this procedure might quite reasonably be expected to be uninfor-
mative. If so, agents would proceed to Step 2, comparing prizes and probabilities across
alternatives in terms of their equality or inequality. In the choice between A and B, A
would be favored in the third paired comparison ($45 > $30 and 1% = 1%) as well as
the fourth (-$10 > -$15 and 1% = 1%), with the remaining paired comparisons (all
of which involve identical prizes at identical probabilities) being inconsequential. As a
consequence, the dominant alternative A would be selected. In the choice between A'
and B', on the other hand, comparisons in Step 2 will prove uninformative since the
second ($45 = $45 and 7% > 6%) favors A', while the third ($30 > - $10 and 1% =
1%) and fourth (-$15 = -$15 and 3% > 2%) favor B'. In this case, agents would
proceed to Step 3 and repeat the set of comparisons in terms ofthe similarity/dissimilarity of
prizes and their associated probabilities. Here, if the 7% and 6% chances of winning $45
and the 2% and 3% chances of losing $15 are deemed "similar," B' will appear preferable so
long as winning $30 is perceived as dissimilar to losing $10.
4.2. Violations of transitivity, again
The findings reported above suggest, contrary to regret theory, that the statistical inde-
pendence or dependence of lotteries may not be of import in explaining violations of
tenets of expected utility like stochastic dominance.'^ These results do not, however, in
and of themselves, imply that such behaviors occur as a consequence of the way the
representation of lotteries infiuences what is compared with what in terms of similarity
and dissimilarity. Consider, however, choices between A and B, B and C, and A and C,
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Note that for this representation of the choices, in contrast to RII in the previous
section, probabilities across lottery components are no longer matched with themselves.
Thus, choices may depend not only upon similarities among prizes but among probabil-
ities as well. Suppose, in particular, thatxi >*X2 >*'X3 >'jC4. In this case, to produce the
intransitive choice pattern BCA by similarity in the probabilities, it would have to be the
case that in the comparison betweenxi andjC3 and between^] and/?3, A was preferred to
C because/73 —^ p\. In that case, A would be "favored" in this pair of comparisons with
the second pair of comparisons,X4 withx4 and 1 - /73 with 1 - p 1, being inconsequential.
This, however, impliesp3 ~Pp2 andp2 ~'^pi, producing the transitive choice pattern A
> B, B > C, A > C. Any of the following similarity relations among probabilities will, on162 JONATHAN W. LELAND
the other hand, allow for the alternative intransitive pattern ABC to occur:
if/72 ~''P\,P3 >''P2 then patterns A, , are possible.
if/72 >''p\,P3 ~''P2 then patterns , B, are possible.
if/72 ~''P\,P2 ~'^P2, but/73 >''p] then patterns A, B, are possible.
As such:
Prediction 6: For choices between lotteries A and B, B and C, and A and C as
represented in RIV, if Xl >*X2 >^X3 >'^X4, similarity => not BCA.
If, instead, it is the probabilities that are perceived as dissimilar (i.e.,/73 >Pp2 >''p\),
then similarities in the prizes can never produce the intransitive pattern ABC, as the only
one of these choices which can be fixed by similarity is C > A ifxi —^x^,. Should this be
the case, however, thenxi ~'^X2 andjC2 —^XT, also follow, requiring the transitive choice
pattern B > A, B > C, C > A. Any of the following similarity relationships will,
however, allow for the intransitive BCA pattern.
•'xi.xa >^X2 then patterns B, ,
''X\,XT, —"X2 then patterns , C,
•*^Xi,X3 ~-'^X2, butxi >^X2, then patterns B, C,
As such:
Prediction 7: For choices between lotteries A and B, B and C, and A and C as
represented in RIV, if/73 >''Pi >''P\, similarity => not ABC.
For prizes ordered 0 > JC4 > XT, > X2 > X\. Predictions 6 and 7 are exactly reversed.
Tversky (1969) presented subjects with choices between lotteries A and B, B and C, C
and D, D and E, and A and E, shown below:
A: [$5.00, 7/24; $0,17/24] (EV = $1.46)
B: [$4.75, 8/24; $0,16/24] (EV = $1.58)
C: [$4.50, 9/24; $0,15/24] (EV = $1.69)
D: [$4.25,10/24; $0,14/24] (EV = $1.77)
E: [$4.00,11/24; $0,13/24] (EV = $1.83)
He reported observing systematic intransitivities of the form A > B, B > C, C > D, D
> E, but E > A analogous to the ABC pattern in Prediction 6. In the experiment,
choices were displayed on cards with the prizes presented in dollars and their associated
probabilities represented by blacked-out, pie-shaped areas on otherwise white disks.
These features of the design can be interpreted as encouraging the perception of prizes
as dissimilar, but probabilities adjacent in value as similar, as required in Prediction 6. ToGENERALIZED SIMILARITY JUDGMENTS 163
the extent that this interpretation is correct, reversing Tversky's experimental procedure
should produce the intransitive pattern consistent with Prediction 7. To examine this
possibility, Leland (1992) presented 64 Carnegie Mellon undergraduates with choices
between the lotteries A and B, B and C, and A and C, shown below.
A: [$12.08, .63; $0, .37] B: [$10.88, .71; $0, .29] C: [$9.67, .79; $0, .21]
EV = $7.61 EV = $7.72 EV = $7.64
In the experiment, and in contrast to Tversky's design, however, it was the probabili-
ties that were stated numerically with the prizes ($12.08, $10.88, and $9.67) represented
as blackened-out fractions ('%4ths, %4ths, and %4ths) of otherwise gray circles, where in
each case an entirely blackened-out circle was worth $29.00. Each subject received a
sheet of instructions about the choice task and was presented with choices between
lotteries A and B, B and C, and A and C. '^ All subjects were informed that one of them
would be randomly selected to play the lottery he or she had chosen on one of the
problems contained in the questionnaire. The choice patterns obtained are shown be-
low. Consistent with Prediction 7, the intransitive BCA pattern occurs significantly more
frequently than the ABC pattern (25% versus 0%) and, indeed, occurs almost as often
as all other patterns (25% versus 27%), save the transitive pattern B > A, B > C, C > A
at 48%.
Pattern BBC BBA ABA BCC ACA ACC ABC BCA
#(%) 3(5%) 1(2%) 6(9%) 31 (48%) 4 (6%) 3(5%) 0(0%) 16(25%)
5. A reinterpretation of the evidence motivating prospect theory
5.7. The properties of prospect theory
The types of behaviors discussed to this point—namely, violations of transitivity, mono-
tonicity, and equivalence—have not, by and large, been those which have traditionally
preoccupied researchers. Instead, systematic departures from the assumption of risk
aversion, discussed early on by Friedman and Savage (1948), and violations of the inde-
pendence axiom, originally discussed by Allais (1953), have been the focus of attention
and, in particular, led Kahneman and Tversky (1979) to specify Prospect Theory in the
way they did. Prospect Theory consists of three primary components: a decision-
weighting function 'n-(.); a value function V(.), exhibiting risk seeking for losses and risk
aversion for gains; and a set of editing rules, a prominent one being the "isolation effect"
(the tendency to "disregard components that alternatives share and focus upon the
components that distinguish them").
The decision-weighting function is assumed to exhibit two key properties—subcer-
tainty (Tr(/7) + TT(1 - p) < 1), and subproportionality (for probabilities/? and ;p, 1 > r>
0, the ratio of their decision weights 'n{ip)h{p) is closer to 1 for low values ofp than164 JONATHAN W. LELAND
Otherwise). The assumption that -n- exhibits subcertainty was made based upon the ob-
served tendency of individuals to commit common consequence violations of indepen-
dence, choosing, for example, S: {$2400, ljover R: {$2400, .66; $2500, .33; $0, .01} but R':
{$2500, .33; $0, .67} over S': {$2400, .34; $0, .66} (the latter pair of lotteries being obtained
from the former by replacing the common component ($2400, .66) in the first pair with
the common component ($0, .66)). Kahneman and Tversky (1979) interpret the first
choice as indicating that "people overweight outcomes that are considered certain, rela-
tive to those which are merely probable—a phenomenon labeled the certainty effect."^'^
The assumption that the decision-weighting function, T7(.), exhibits subproportionality
and assumptions regarding the nature of the value function, V(.), were, on the other
hand, based upon the pattern of choices observed in common ratio problems of the type
discussed early in this article and how that pattern reverses when the lotteries are re-
flected around zero. Specifically, the choice of S': {$3000, .90; $0, .10} over R': {$6000,.
45; $0, .55}, but R': {-$6000, .45; $0, .55}over S': {-$3000, .90; $0, .10} was interpreted
as indicating that V(.) was defined on gains and losses and S-shaped (risk-averse for
gains and risk-seeking for losses). The tendency of individuals to exhibit the opposite
risk-preference patterns when the probabilities associated with the nonzero outcomes
were small (i.e., R: {$6000, .01; $0, .99} > S: {$3000, .02; $0, .98} and S: {-$3000, .02; $0, .98}
> R: { - $6000, .01; $0, .99}) was taken to imply the subproportionality property of'n-(,).
Finally, the assumption that individuals tend to ignore components common across
alternatives followed from behavior observed when subjects were given a two-stage game
where in the first stage there was a .25 chance of going to the second stage and playing
either the lottery S': {$3000} or the lottery R': {$4000, .8; $0, .2}. Here, agents required to
choose between R' and S' before the game began tended to choose the safer alternative.
When the alternatives were presented in single stage form (i.e., choose between {$3000,
.25; $0, .75} and {$4000, .20; $0, .80}), however, they chose the riskier one, in violation of
the reduction of compound lotteries axiom.
Now consider how such behaviors might come about as a consequence of choice based
upon similarity judgments.
5.2. Common consequence violations ofthe independence axiom and reflection effects
Consider again the choices SR and S'R', in which common consequence violations of the
independence axiom occur:
S: {$2400,1; $0, .0} S': {$2400, .34; $0, .66}
R: {$2400, .66; $2500, .33; $0, .01} R: {$2500, .33; $0, .67}
Note that, in the choice between the lottery S and R, it is not obvious what agents will
compare with what in terms of similarity. Any perceived representation of these choices
involving a comparison of $2400 and $0 cannot, however, lead the agent to choose R over
S by similarity, so long as $2400 is greater than and dissimilar to $0. If so, R offers some
probability of the worst possible outcome. The choice between S': {$2400, .34; $0, .66} andGENERALIZED SIMILARITY JUDGMENTS 165
R': {$2500, .33; $0, .67}, on the other hand, will be resolved by similarity in favor of R', so
long as $2500 >^ $2400 and .34 ~P .33. As such, what is interpreted as a certainty effect in
Prospect Theory occurs here, because, in the choice between S and R, the fact that the latter
offers some probability of the worst possible prize cannot be obscured. In the choice be-
tween S' and R', on the other hand, this is obscured. Indeed, along the lines of Prediction 3
(i.e., no common consequence violations) in section 3.1, similarity judgments imply that for
representations of S' and R', shown below, the riskier alternative could not be selected
based upon similarity, as the fact that it offers some probability of the worst possible out-
come is made explicit.
S': {$2400, .33; $0, .66; $2400, .01}
R': {$2500, .33; SO, .66; $0, .01}
Note also that should choices between S and R and between S' and R' involve losses instead
of gains, similarityjudgments imply reflection effects (i.e., R: { - $2500, .33; - $2400, .66; $0,
.01} will be selected over S: {- $2400,1}, and S': {- $2400, .34; $0, .67} will be selected over
R': {-$2500,. 33; $0,.67}.
5.3. Common ratio effects, refiection, and violations ofthe reduction of compound
lotteries axiom
For purposes of explaining the remaining evidence discussed above, assumptions regard-
ing the nature of the similarity relation, ~P, are required. To see why, recall that Rubin-
stein (1988) showed that unless the relation, ~/\ was of a ratio form such thatpi; —'' p2j
if for 8 > 1, 1/8 < p\jlp2j ^ 8, independence would be violated. Assume instead an
8-difference similarity such thatp ly ~/'p2/if |pi; - P2j\ ^ e. Now consider common ratio
type choices between probability distributions R and S, represented as shown in RV for
x\ > X2 > X3 > 0:
RV
R:{xi,Xp;x3,1 - \p)
S:{v2, p;x3,1 - p}
Given this representation, choice will be resolved as follows:
1. R by similarity \fx\ >-^X2 and/7 ~P \p;xi ~'X3 and \ - \p ~P \ - p,
2. S by similarity ifxi ~* JC2 andp >P \p;xT, —*X3 and 1 - \p >P 1 - p,
3. Either at random ifxi ~*X2 and/? ~P Xp;x2 —"-XT, and \ - Kp ~P \ - p, or
4. S by similarity \fx\ >-*X2 and/? >P \p;x2 ~*X3 and \ - \p >P \ - p.
For reductions in the value ofp, individuals initially holding perceptions correspond-
ing to 1 will continue to choose R, those corresponding to 2 eventually choose at random,
and those corresponding to 3 will continue to choose at random. For agents choosing S166 JONATHAN W. LELAND
because R offers the worst prize,X3, at greater and dissimilar probability (case 4), on the
other hand, reductions inp sufficiently large to result inp —'' \p (and 1 - \p ~P I - p)
will produce switches from choice of S to choice of R. In no case, however, can reduc-
tions inp ever result in switches from R to S. Conversely, for the case of 0 > X3 > X2 >
xi, reductions in the value ofp cannot result in switches from S to R. As such:
Prediction 8: For choices between probability distributions R and S for jci > X2 > X3
> 0 (0 > X3 > X2 > xi), represented as RV, if —'' is a difference similarity, then for
decreases inp, and thus/? - \p, similarity => not RS (not SR).
Now suppose instead that choices between R and S were represented in the two-stage
game context in which reduction-of-compound-lotteries violations are revealed. Specif-
ically, assume that choices between R: ^\,r\p;x3,1 - r\p} and S: {c2, rp;xT,, \ - rp} for
I > p > 0,1 > r > p, and 1 > X > 0, presented as two-stage games, are represented or
interpreted by agents as in RVI below:
RVI
R:[{c\,\p;x3,l - \p},r;x3,l - r],
S: [^2,p;xi, 1 - p},r,X3,1 - /•].
Note first that the comparison ofthe component (X3,1 - /•) with itself will always be
viewed as inconsequential. Note also that r will always be perceived as similar to itself, in
which case possible similarity relationships among the remaining prizes and their corre-
sponding probabilities, as well as their implications regarding choice, are identical to
those pertaining to Prediction 8. The value of r does, however, indirectly influence the
choice, in that the size of r determines the difference^ - \p. For r = p, the difference/7
- \p is maximal. As the value of r is increased, the difference/7 - Xp declines, in which
case increases in r have the same effect as reductions inp in Prediction 8. As such:
Prediction 9: Given RVI representations of the choice between probability distribu-
tions R and S, in which /-varies from low to high, if ~i' is a difference similarity, then for
increases in r, similarity => not RS (not SR for 0 > X3 > X2 > x\).
5.4. Violations of invariance among two-stage lotteries
As noted above, common ratio violations exhibited for gains and losses are interpreted in
Prospect Theory as revealing information about risk preference and as indicating sys-
tematic biases in the way small probabilities are treated, while violations of the
reduction-of-compound-lotteries axiom are interpreted as indicating an "isolation ef-
fect." Loomes and Sugden (1982) propose instead that common ratio violations occur,
because, in the absence of contrary information, agents assume that the lotteries in-
volved are statistically independent, in which case convexity ofthe regret/rejoice function
i|i (.,.) allows for such behavior. In the two-stage game format, on the other hand, they
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or independence of the alternatives, agents assume the former, in which case the less
risky alternative may be preferred. Predictions 8 and 9 instead suggest that such
behaviors are all just additional consequences of choice being based upon similarity
judgments.
To discriminate between these alternative interpretations, note that, according to
Prediction 9, violations of the reduction-of-compound-lotteries axiom are simply an ex-
treme case of violations of invariance occurring among different two-stage representa-
tions of single-stage lotteries. Leland (1991) investigated this implication. Fifty Carnegie
Mellon University undergraduates were presented with hypothetical choices between
lotteries R, and S, for parameter values shown below.
Imagine being allowed to participate in the following two-stage game (for / = 1 to 4).
In the first stage, there is a 1 - r, chance that the game will end and you will win
nothing, and an r, chance of moving to the second stage. If you reach the second stage,
you will have a choice between either:
R,: a lottery ticket offering a Xp, chance of winning $4000, and a l-Kpi chance of
winning nothing.
S,: a lottery ticket offering a/?, chance of winning $3000, and a l-p, chance of winning
nothing.




































As is clear from the table, these four two-stage representations differ in the amount of
mass placed in the first stage of the game (i.e., in the size of r) and in the difference in
mass between the probabilities, p and \p, in the terminal lotteries R,- and S/. All four
choice problems are, however, identical in the prizes and equivalent to the second deci-
mal place in the probabilities. Assuming ~i' is a difference similarity, the systematic
occurrence ofthe choice patterns SSSS, SSSR, SSRR, SRRR, and RRRR is consistent
with the model proposed in this article, while the systematic occurrence of the other 11
possible patterns is not.
The results for all 50 subjects are summaried in table 1, where the 11 non-predicted
response patterns and their associated frequencies of occurrence are presented first,
followed by the five predicted patterns and their corresponding frequencies. Consistent
with the prediction of the model, the latter account for 47/50 (94%) of the response
patterns observed, while the proportion of respondents choosing option S (90%, 86%,168 JONATHAN W. LELAND
Table I. Invariance violations























































































































68%, and 40%) declines monotonically with the difference between/? and \p (.f 9, .15,
.10, and .05). These differences in proportion across problems are significant (Cochran's
Q = 48.63 > f6.26(.()()i_ 3d.f.)). Moreover, using a model of quasi-independence, the
hypothesis that the non-predicted patterns occur randomly cannot be rejected (Pear-
son's ^"2 = 3.02 < 4.6f(.io,2d.f.))-
The format of questions 1 through 4 is virtually identical to the two-stage format
employed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979). As such, according to the explanation for
violations of the reduction-of-compound-lotteries axiom proposed by Loomes and Sug-
den (1982), agents should have interpreted each of choices 1 through 4 as involving
statistically dependent actions. If so, however, regret theory would predict no switching
between S and R. The observed switching from S to R is also difficult to attribute to the
subproportionality of prospect theory's decision-weighting function, since it applies only
to "small" probabilities. Across all four problems, however, the smallest probabilities are
.25 and .2, occurring in Problem 4. Moreover, even if these were sufficiently small as to
produee a reversal between Problems 3 and 4, subproportionality would not imply rever-
sals between Problem 2 (in which the probabilities in the terminal lotteries are .75 andGENERALIZED SIMILARITY JUDGMENTS 169
.60) and Problem 3 (where the probabilities are .5 and .4). Nonetheless, there are signif-
ieant decreases in the proportion of subjeets ehoosing the S option between Problems 2
(86%) and 3 (68%) (A^ = 5.33 > 5.02(.()25, l.d.f.)), as well as between Problems 3 (68%)
and 4 (40%) {x^ = 8.89 > 7.88(.oo5, id.f.))- These results, in turn, suggest that the key to
produeing expeeted utility violations via manipulation of probability values lies not in the
magnitude of the probabilities, as implied by prospect theory's decision-weighting func-
tion, but in the magnitude of the difference in probabilities consistent with ~P being an
e-differenee similarity.
6. Conclusions
Evidenee demonstrating choiee anomalies has been widely interpreted as indicating that
people do not wish to obey expected utility and has resulted in a plethora of alternative
models of choice under uncertainty. This article has explored the alternative hypothesis
that individuals who are unwilling or unable to rationally resolve choices between alter-
natives whieh are in some sense "close" in expected utility or value base their choices
upon simple comparative procedures involving the equality/inequality or similarity/dis-
similarity of prizes and probabilities across alternatives. As such, the model proposed
here may be seen as a complement to, rather than a substitute for, expected utility, or, for
that matter, expeeted value, maximization. The economic relevance of behavior implied
by similarity judgments depends upon whether sueh judgments are employed, because
relying upon a more eoherent procedure is merely costly (in which case, incentives
should eliminate departures from rationality) or prohibitively so (in which case, similar-
ity judgments may influence choice in decisions of importanee). Recent inquiries as to
whether financial incentives matter for the types of behaviors diseussed in this article
(e.g., Camerer (1989), and Battalio, Kagel, and Jiranyakul (1990)) suggest the latter.
In any case, the ability of the model presented here to explain a large subset of choice
anomalies and, in the process, to draw the deseriptive validity of two very different
alternatives to expeeted utility into question is significant. For representations of ehoices
where for each of the; pairs of comparisons made,piy is equal top^j, the model prediets
violations of equivalenee, monotonicity, and transitivity heretofore unique to regret the-
ory. For other representation or manipulations of ehoices, the model proposed implies
behaviors which formed the basis for prospect theory. The appearance of "certainty
effects," subproportionality, risk aversion for gains, and risk seeking for losses are exam-
ples. In addition, the model uniquely predicts violations of tenets of rationality, such as
dominance among statistically independent prospects, the intransitive choice pattern
reported by Tversky when probabilities appear similar, the opposite pattern when prizes
appear similar, and systematic preferenee reversals between different two-stage repre-
sentations of a ehoiee between the same single-stage lotteries. All these predictions have,
at least preliminary, experimental support. In sum, the results reported in this artiele
suggest that a more extensive inquiriy into the role of similarity judgments in ehoiee is in
order.170 JONATHAN W. LELAND
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Notes
1. The requirement that agents be indifferent between two options corresponding to the same probability
distribution.
2. The requirement that agents prefer stochastieally dominating alternatives.
3. That is, given choices between A: {-$3000, .02; $0, .98} and B: {-$6000, .01; $0, .99} and between A':
{-$3000, .90; $0, .10} and B' {-$6000, .45; $0, .55}, agents tend to exhibit the response pattern AB'.
4. For axiomatizations of such models, see Vincke (1980) and Nakamura (1988).
5. That is, for alUj, andxi, E X.Xf, >'A/, ^^^ nolxi, >'Ag, same forp's 6 [0, 1], and for alU/ > Xg.xi, e X:xf
>-^Xg,Xf, >'A.'/, ^Xf >"Arg, same for/7's e [0.1].
6. That is, for allxj, andAV, G X:Xg ~'xi, ^xi, —'AJ,, same forp's G [0, 1].
7. More precisely, the predictions discussed will apply for prizes ordered "best," "good," "bad"; or "worst,"
"bad," "good."
8. Common consequence effects occur when replacing the prize value in a prize-probability pair common to
two lotteries influences an agent's choice (e.g., S: {$2400; 1; $0, .0} > R: {$2400 .66; $2500, .33; $0, .01}, but
R': {$2500, .33; $0, .67} > S': {$2400, .34; $0, .66} (the latter pair of lotteries being obtained from the former
by replacing the common component ($2400, .66) in the first pair with the common component ($0, .66)).
9. Experimental evidence supporting Predictions 1 and 2 is somewhat ambiguous. With state-dependent
matrix representations similar to RIa and b, Loomes (1988) and Loomes and Sugden (1987) report results
indicating an absence of common ratio effects in choices involving certain sets of prize values, but evidence
of common ratio effects for other sets. Starmer and Sugden (1989) report an absence of common ratio
violations for choices involving losses, but find violations for choices involving gains. Starmer and Sugden
(1987) report an absence of common consequence effects for lotteries represented in state-dependent
matrices similar to RIa and b, but note that Slovic and Tversky (1974) and Moskowitz (1974) did report
common consequence violations in similar experiments. In contrast, evidence supporting Prediction 3 is
unequivocal; Loomes and Sugden (1987), Loonies (1988), and Starmer and Sugden (1989) all report
observing systematic juxtaposition effects consistent with Prediction 3.
10. In the shorthand employed to denote possible choice patterns across the lottery triple (e.g., ABC), the first
letter indicates the choice made between A and B, the next letter the choice made between B and C, and
the last letter the choice made between A and C (thus, ABC implies choosing A over B, B over C, and C
over A).
11. Note that with C offeringA.-j with certainty, the intransitive choice pattern BCA is the pure choice analog to
the preference reversals reported by Lichtenstein and Slovic (1971), Grether and Plott (1982), and others.
Specifically, choosing B over A, corresponds to choosing thepbet over the $bet, while choosing C over B
and A over C correspond to assigning a lower price to thepbet than to the $bet.
12. Employing state-dependent matrix representations similar to RII for lotteries involving gains, Loomes,
Starmer, and Sugden (1991) report systematic violations of the BCA variety, while Loomes and Taylor
(1992) report systematic intransitivities of the opposite type for choices involving losses. Both results are
consistent with Prediction 4.
13. Loomes and Sugden (1992) find that individuals do violate stochastic dominance in the manner consistent
with Prediction 5. They did not find that violations of equivalence differed significantly from a 50/50 split
(indiflerence statements were not allowed), although this result is not inconsistent with Prediction 5, which
only requires that the lottery A' not be chosen systematically.
14. Recall from footnote 10 that Loomes and Sugden (1992) found systematic violations of stochastic domi-
nance, but not violations of equivalence reqttired by regret theory, but only allowed by similarity. Indeed,GENERALIZED SIMILARITY JUDGMENTS 171
Loomes and Sugden (1992) speculate, consistent with the hypothesis put forth in this article, that "this
raises the possibility that the violations of monotonicity that we found ... were the result of some factor
other than regret."
15. Specifically, for predictions regarding choices between Sa and Ra, and between Sb and Rb, and in choices
between probabilistically equivalent lotteries.
16. Specifically, the 6% (red) and 1 % (green) chances of winning $45 in A are combined to produce a 7% (red)
chance of $45 in A', and the 1% (blue) and 2% (yellow) chances of losing $15 in B are combined to
produce a 3% (yellow) chance of losing $15 in B'.
17. These results might also come about if agents whose preferences are as assumed in regret theory choose
according to similarity judgments when incentives are low, rather than incur costs associated with trans-
forming the alternatives into their appropriate matrix representation. Harless (1992), however, presents
evidence revealing failures of regret theory which are difficult to attribute to it being costly to produce the
appropriate matrix representation ofthe alternatives. Specifically, he examined regret theory's predictions
regarding the occurrence of common ratio violations due to the juxtaposition of prizes as in Prediction 3.
For standard matrix representations of the alternatives shown below on the left, with probabilities of states
operationaiized as lottery tickets numbered 1 through 100, the predictions of regret theory held. However,


























The only differences between the proportional and the matrix representations are that in the former the
lotteries are separated by a horizontal space and the vertical lines separating identical outcomes have been
removed. Harless (1992) notes that the absence of juxtaposition effects here is hard to attribute to insuffi-
cient incentives, as "discerning the juxtaposition of consequences requires just the tiniest bit more effort
than required in the matrix format..." (i.e., that associated with extending the vertical lines dividing prizes
in lotteries up and down). Note also that, in the context of the Similarity model, the absence of regret
effects in this format is not surprising, as, once the vertical lines are removed, probabilities in one alterna-
tive are no longer compared with probabilities of of identical value in the other alternative.
18. Within each questionnaire, choices between lotteries were presented on separate pages, with A to the left
of B, B to the left of C, and C to the right of A, or vice versa, and with questions sequenced inali possible
orders (for a total of 12 questionnaire types).
19. The certainty effect was also hypothesized based upon the observation that people exhibited common ratio
violations of independence when one of the outcomes was to be received with certainty (e.g., {$3000} >
{$4000, .8} but {$4000, .20} > {$3000, .25}).
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